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OPTIMAL RENT EXTRACTION IN 
PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND AND FRANCE 




Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, England changed its system of raising revenues 
from tax farming, combined with the granting of monopolies, to direct collection within the 
government administration. Rents were then transferred from tax farmers and monopolists to 
the central government such that English public finances improved dramatically compared to 
both the old system and to its major competitor, France. We offer a theory explaining this 
development. In our view, a cost of tax farming is the ex-ante inefficiency due to the auction 
mechanism while a cost of direct collection is the ex-post monitoring cost the government 
incurs to prevent theft. When the monitoring cost is high the government therefore allows tax 
farmers to extract large rents to enhance their up-front payments. In addition, because 
revenues materialize late under direct collection, and since the government faces limited 
borrowing, a high default risk makes a system of up-front collection attractive. The results of 
the model are consistent with historical facts from England and France. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Civil War in England in 1640, English and French monarchs
typically sold tax farmers the rights to tax goods, such as patents, li-
censes, salt, clothing, and trade1, and oligarchs the right to become
monopolists2. The tax farmers and monopolists on their part used their
positions to create huge fortunes [Brewer 1988, Swart 1980]3.I n t h e
period that followed the Civil War, however, the English ﬁscal system
started to change in favor of direct ex-post collection through government
oﬃcials [Brewer 1988, O’Brien 2002]. Along with this change, public ﬁ-
nances improved signiﬁcantly [Braddick 1996, Hunt and O’Brien 1999
and Ferguson 2001].4 In the period that followed the Glorious Revo-
lution in 1688 the tradition of collecting revenues up-front through tax
farming was almost terminated; at the same time, oﬃcials’ rents were
reduced and the public ﬁnances improved dramatically [Lipson 1948,
1Swart [1980] gives a detailed description of the historical farming of taxes and
t h es a l eo fo ﬃce in England and France as well as in many other countries. See
also Matthews [1958], North and Thomas [1973], Chandaman [1975], Ekelund and
Tollison [1981], North [1981], Brewer [1988] and O’Brien [2002].
2Matthews [1958, p. 30], for example, describes how the sale of oﬃce worked in
France: “The purchaser paid the government a lump sum, known as the ﬁnance of the
oﬃce. This ﬁnance represented the capital or principal of the permanent loan which
the purchaser was advancing to the treasury. In turn, the government attributed to
the oﬃce certain salaries or perquisites known as gages. The gages were, in eﬀect,
the annual interest earned by the ﬁnance”
3In England in 1630, for example, the rents of the crown were around £ 80 000
whereas monopolists earned between £200 000 and £300 000 [Brewer 1988].
4Even though the farming of taxes was formally abandoned in the excise in 1673
and in the customs in 1683, up-front collection of revenues continued to be used in
diﬀerent forms [Swart 1980 and Brewer 1988].
2Hill 1970, Chandaman 1975 and Brewer 1988].5 The development of
the English system of revenue collection stands in stark contrast to the
situation in France; here, not only tax farming was continuously used
for rent extraction until the mid-nineteenth century [Brewer 1988 and
Kiser and Kane 2001], but public ﬁnances fared poorly and tax farmers
kept earning large rents [Brewer 1988 and Ekelund and Tollison 1981].
In this paper, we oﬀer a theory explaining the developments that
occurred in England during the seventeenth century, the diﬀerences with
France and their consequences for the amount of rents appropriated by
the government, private contractors and government oﬃcials.
We model the government’s choice between tax farming and direct
tax collection as a tradeoﬀ between the ex-ante ineﬃciencies of tax farm-
ing and the ex-post monitoring costs of direct tax collection. While under
tax farming the government cannot extract the full value of the oﬃce
sold because of auction ineﬃciencies6, under direct tax collection the
government must incur a cost to monitor oﬃcials to make sure that they
do not steal tax revenues.
When monitoring costs are large, the government prefers to auction
oﬀ oﬃc e sa n dc a s hi nu p - f r o n tp a y m e n t s . 7 The distributional conse-
quence of such choice is that in so doing, the central authority allows
contractors to earn large rents. On the other hand, if monitoring costs
5Ferguson [2001, p. 90] writes “In the 1670s, Charles II disposed of 2.7 times as
much revenue as his benighted father had managed with such diﬃculty to collect
just a half century earlier. Fifty years later, the revenues of the newly established
Hanoverian regime were eight times, and in the 1770s eleven times, greater than those
spent by Charles I.”
6In our model, bidders have private information about their interest rate, and
therefore about their value of the oﬃce, which together generates the ineﬃciency.
7Swart [1980], Brewer [1988] and Kiser and Kane [2001] all argue that when the
costs of monitoring oﬃcials were high, monitoring was scarce and theft common.
3are low the government opts for direct tax collection. This allows it to
enjoy larger revenues because now it is the government, not the oﬃcial,
to collect most of the value of the oﬃce.
The predictions of this theory are in line with historical evidence.
Indeed, it is a common view among scholars [Chandaman 1978, Ekelund
and Tollison 1981, Brewer 1988 and Kiser and Kane 2001] that during
the seventeenth century the cost of monitoring oﬃcials in England fell
much below the one prevailing in France, where the government’s collec-
tion of indirect taxes was so diﬃcult to be deemed “an administrative
nightmare” [Brewer, 1988 p. 129].
This evidence supports the view that low monitoring costs induced
English monarchs to switch to tax collection, which ultimately improved
their ﬁnances, whereas the high monitoring costs that characterized
France throughout the period led the French government to stick to
tax farming to its great ﬁnancial disadvantage.
Beyond ex-post monitoring, a fundamental diﬀerence between tax
farming and direct tax collection is the timing of government’s revenues.
With tax farming the government receives an immediate up-front pay-
ment, with direct tax collection revenues materialize in a second period.
It is thus likely that diﬀerences in government’s access to debt ﬁnance
shaped the choice of either method.
Incorporating this intertemporal element into the choice of the cen-
tral authority, we ﬁnd that when the government’s default risk is high,
since it faces limited borrowing, ex-post collection in combination with
ex-ante borrowing is unattractive. As a result, the government prefers
to let a contractor earn large rents to enhance his up-front payments.
When instead the government’s default risk is low, direct tax collection
4is chosen in combination with the issuing of debt.8
Our paper thus gives formal support to a number of studies arguing
that high interest rates led to the change in the English revenue system.
Brewer [1988] and Bordo and White [1991] argue that owing to higher
interest rates faced by French monarchs, they could not aﬀord to borrow
and thus had a more ineﬃcient revenue system than in England.
The divergence in the default risk of the French and English govern-
ments around the time of the Glorious Revolution makes sense of this
story and suggests that default risk may have played an important role
in shaping government’s method of tax collection. Before the Revolu-
tion, the credit worthiness of both the English and the French monarchs
was typically low and defaults on loans were common [see e.g. Ekelund
and Tollison 1981, Brewer 1988, North and Weingast 1989, Bordo and
White 1991 and Velde and Weir 1992]. After the Revolution, however,
the English Parliament, in contrast to the French monarchs, never de-
faulted on their loans again [Brewer 1988] and it is a well-known fact
that the credibility of the English Parliament was far higher than that
of the French monarchs [see e.g. Bordo and White 1991 and Velde and
Weir 1992].
Several papers also support the notion that monitoring costs aﬀected
the government’s choice between tax farming and direct tax collection.
Ekelund and Tollison [1981], Brewer [1988], O’Brien and Hunt [1999]
and Kiser and Kane [2001] argue that high monitoring costs reduced the
possibilities of using direct collection of taxes so that the rulers’ only
option was to grant monopolies.9
8Matthews [1958, p. 9] sums up our theory neatly: “Tax-farming oﬀered two
advantages: it relieved the king from the necessity of developing (in a direct sense)
his own system of tax collection, and it satisﬁed an urgent need of cash.”
9Our theory may also help explain the development in the German states. How-
5Overall, our paper contributes to this literature by revisiting its ar-
guments within a micro-founded model where a self interested central
authority chooses between tax farming and direct tax collection.
There are also several related papers based on economics modeling.
Becker and Stigler [1974], and later Carmichael [1985], have emphasized
that, to avoid shirking, prospective tax inspectors could be required to
post bonds to the government.10 In our model, the up-front payment
is not a bond but a sunk cost. Toma and Toma [1992] suggest that
tax farmers, in contrast to government oﬃcials, are residual claimants,
which gives them incentives to work hard but also to overdetect tax-
evasion since they do not take into account the utility loss this inﬂicts
on taxpayers. Government oﬃcials on the other hand have incentives
ever, since these states were heterogeneous it is beyond the scope of this paper to
give a full treatment of the German case. In short, the German states, beginning
with Prussia and ending with Württemberg, changed their ﬁscal system of up-front
collection in favour of ex-post collection in the beginning of the nineteenth century
[Ogilvie 1999]. Before the change, the system typically left oﬃcials, and not the cen-
tral authority, rich [see e.g. Vierhaus 1999]. In line with our theory, the monitoring
cost and the government default risk were reduced at the time of the change in the
ﬁscal system. The infrastructure in the German states started to develop signiﬁcantly
at the end of the eighteenth century [Ogilvie 1999 and 2000]. The interest rates for
state borrowing in the larger German states fell from around 5 percent to around 4
percent in the beginning of the nineteenth century [Homer 1963 and Hoﬀmann 1965].
A reason for this may have been that Germany was laid waste by Napoleon before
the change, which certainly did not promote a low default risk. The stability that
followed the Vienna Congress in 1815 might have reduced the default risk and, as a
consequence, the interest rate for government borrowing.
10Dickens et al. [1989] however argue that due to liquidity constraints, moral
hazard by employees who sack workers for no good reasons, legal restrictions on
contracts which means that bonds cannot be easily enforced, and social constraints,
this is not possible.
6to shirk. White [2004] takes the stand that, in line with the principal-
agent problem of share cropping [Stiglitz 1974], French tax farmers were
used to absorb risk. Moreover, White [2004] argues, without providing a
formal model, that the monarchs’ monitoring costs and access to credit
markets help to explain variations in the French ﬁscal system in the
eighteenth century. Similar to Toma and Toma [1992] and White [2004]
we argue that tax farmers are used to avoid monitoring costs, but in
our model this system is unattractive due to ineﬃciencies in the auction
mechanism. Johnson [2003] ﬁnally shows that tax farmers were used
in France because they could make the investments necessary to collect
taxes at a lower cost than the monarch could and because they worked
as ﬁnancial intermediaries. While Johnson focuses only on France, and
on the reasons for a change in the French auction system, we study
both how changes in monitoring costs and default risks aﬀected the
developments of the ﬁscal systems in England and in France as well as
their distributional consequences. In contrast to Johnson, we also model
the interaction between the central authority and the tax-collector with
regard to monitoring and theft.
More generally, the paper relates to the incomplete contract litera-
ture, which studies whether a government should provide a service in-
house and when it should outsource the provision (see e.g. Laﬀont and
Tirole 1993, Schmidt 1996 and Hart et al. 1997).11
11Other theories explaining the diﬀerent development in England and France is e.g.
North [1981] who argues that the diﬀerence between England and France was that
English parliamentarians, in their capacity as businessmen, beneﬁted from developing
property rights. North and Weingast [1989] and later Finer [1997] instead argue that
the English system of divided power (between the parliament, the crown and common
law) was more eﬃcient than the system of concentrated power in France. This
argument, however, is inconsistent with Olson’s [1993] view that a secure autocrat
7The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II we present
historical evidence from England and France on monitoring costs and
default risk. The theoretical analysis, which takes its starting point in
Shleifer and Vishny [1993], is presented in Section III.12 In Section IV,
we allow for the possibility that agents, in addition to investors, may
have been subject to the monarchs’ inability to credibly commit to their
decisions. Conclusions are oﬀered in Section V.
II. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON MONITORING COSTS
AND DEFAULT RISK IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR
It is a well known fact that the cost of monitoring oﬃcials was reduced
in the seventeenth century in England to a level which was lower than
the one in France [Chandaman 1978, Ekelund and Tollison 1981, Brewer
1988 and Kiser and Kane 2001].
Ar e a s o nf o rt h i sd i ﬀerence may be the “remarkable” growth of Eng-
lish urbanism from the mid-seventeenth century [Brewer 1988, p. 180].13
When people work for companies in cities, commercial record-keeping
within the government administration is more eﬃc i e n tt h a ni fp e o p l e
has an encompassing interest, which has a positive eﬀect on economic performance.
12Similar to Shleifer and Vishny [1993], an agent sells government goods and he
may or may not report the sale to the central authority. In our model, the central
authority also uses the agent to extract rents for its own purposes through up-front
versus ex-post collection. An additional diﬀerence is that we introduce the cost of
monitoring the agent and the default risk.
13Between 1600 and 1750, the number of English towns with populations between
5 000 and 10 000 doubled, while in continental Europe the total of such towns fell
[Brewer 1988]. In 1700, the percentage of people living in cities of at least 10 000
habitants was 13.3 in England and Wales and 9.2 in France. In 1750, the percentage
was 16.7 for England and Wales and 9.1 for France [De Vries 1984].
8work in small-scale heterogeneous units on the countryside [Brewer 1988
and O’Brien and Hunt 1999].14
Another reason for the diﬀerence in monitoring costs may be that the
transportation infrastructure was less developed in France, in combina-
tion with the fact that the geography of the country was not favorable
for tax collection [Szostak 1991, Oligvie 2000 and Kiser and Kane 2001].
Szostak [1991], for example, argues that roads and bridges as well as
waterways were much better developed in England from the seventeenth
century and onwards compared to France. “The ﬁrst turnpikes were
introduced in the seventeenth century, while in the ﬁrst half of the eigh-
teenth a network of turnpike roads was established linking virtually all
towns in England [Szostak 1991, p. 60]. The situation was diﬀerent in
France. According to Szostak [1991, p. 61] “...it is clear that around
1700 the roads /in France/ were in a deplorable state”.15 As for wa-
terways, in contrast to France, England “paid considerable attention to
improvement of waterways in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”
[Szostak 1991, p. 56].16
14There is a vast literature dealing with why England became more urban than
France. One distinct diﬀerence between England and France was the English Acts
of Enclosement, whereby land that had earlier been common became the property
of private landowners. As a consequence, a large number of people had to leave
the countryside to work in the emerging industrial sectors in urban areas [see e.g.
Clarkson 1971, Dillard 1967 and Rider 1995].
15Ogilvie [2000, p. 125] also states “Elsewhere on the continent /compared to
England/ neither markets nor states made much of a start on improving land trans-
portation until the late eighteenth century”.
16The question as to why England developed a better infrastructure goes beyond
the scope of this paper. However, England did not possess a technological advantage
over France. One reason may instead be that the French bureaucracy was too rigid to
be able to develop the infrastructure [Szostak 1991]. Moreover, entrenched political
elites may not have favored economic development due to their fear of losing rents
9When transportation is poor and government oﬃcials control vast
areas, citizens as well as government oﬃcials can easily avoid detection;
they will not be detected unless monitoring costs are low [Weber 1968].
One of the binding pre-industrial restrictions, for example, was probably
poor control of territorial perimeters. As messages, oﬃcials, etc. moved
slowly, it was diﬃcult to control the far ends of large countries [Finer
1997]. As Kiser and Kane [2001, p. 214] write: “The timing of the
bureaucratization of indirect taxes in France lagged far behind that in
England. This diﬀerence can be traced primarily to the monitoring
problems caused by size and the slower development of communications
and transportation technology.”
In consequence, we would expect theft to be rare and monitoring to
be common within the English administration, and theft to be common
and monitoring rare within the French administration. This is supported
by Swart [1980], Brewer [1988] and Kiser and Kane [2001]. For the case
of England, Brewer [1988, p. 108], for example, notes: “The idle oﬃcer
was discouraged by the high probability of detection and punishment”.17
As regards France, Kiser and Kane [2001, p. 203] state: “Prior to the
signiﬁcant development of communications and transportation technolo-
gies in France around 1780...the monitoring capacity of French rulers was
too limited to control ﬁxed provincial oﬃcials.”18
Historical evidence also shows that the default risk in England and
France diverged around the time of the Glorious Revolution in 1688.
[Gerschenkron 1970 and Acemoglu and Robinson 2000]. Szostak [1991] suggests that
this can explain why the French infrastructure developed so slowly.
17We note, however, that remote areas of England, such as Scotland, sometimes
escaped taxation [O’Brien 1988].
18For example, in the sixteenth century, it took three weeks to get from Paris to
Lyon. In the seventeenth century, Paris to Toulouse took fourteen days. In 1765 it
still took ten - sixteen days to get from Paris to the edges of France [Kiser 1994].
10Before the Revolution, both the English and the French monarchs often
defaulted on their loans [see e.g. Ekelund and Tollison 1981, Brewer
1988, North and Weingast 1989, Bordo and White 1991 and Velde and
Weir 1992]. Velde and Weir [1992, p. 5], for example, ﬁnd that: “Prior
to 1688, both monarchies / England and France / resorted to default
in times of ﬁscal crisis”. Brewer [1988, p. 20] states that before 1688
in France: “In a crisis, the ﬁscal prudence of rulers was thrown to the
winds, the long-term liability of venality overlooked in the headlong rush
for immediate funds”.
After the Revolution, this tradition was stopped in England but not
in France and the credibility of the English Parliament was far higher
than that of the French monarchs. According to Stasavage [2002, p.
164], for example, “English governments after 1688 did, on average, im-
prove their credibility with regard to debt repayment when compared
with their predecessors”. When discussing France, Stasavage [2002, p.
177] instead ﬁnds: “...there is ample evidence to show that the French
government lacked credibility as a borrower throughout the eighteenth
century”. Ferguson [2001, p. 172], for example, writes that in contrast
to England “French yields in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
reveal starkly the impact of ﬁscal unreliability on investor conﬁdence”.
To quote Matthews [1958, p. 9] “On its own credit backed by the proﬁts
d e r i v e df r o ma ne x p l o i t a t i o no ft h eG e n e r a lF a r m s ,t h eC o m p a n yb o r -
rowed from those who, for good reasons, were reluctant to lend directly
to the /French/ king.”
Two reasons why the English Parliament was more credible than the
French monarchs are given by North and Weingast [1989] and Bordo and
White [1991]. North and Weingast [1989] argue that after the Glorious
Revolution, checks and balances emerged among the parliament, the ju-
11diciary and the king in England, which raised the predictability of the
government. Bordo and White [1991] similarly argue that English insti-
tutions such as checks and balances and the Bank of England, enhanced
credibility compared to France.
Lenders want a high risk premium when the credibility of the bor-
rower is low. In line with what we would expect, historical data conﬁrms
that the interest rate was typically high both in France and England be-
fore the Glorious Revolution, and low afterwards in England but still
high in France. In the ﬁrst half of the seventeenth century, the English
monarchs typically paid 10-14 percent on their loans, and in the second
half the interest was 6-12 percent. Even though the French monarchs
seem to have borrowed at low interest rates, 3.5-5 percent, in the ﬁrst
half of the seventeenth century, the interest rate in the second half was
5-7 percent and sometimes as high as above 14 percent [Homer 1963,
Epstein 2000].19 After the Glorious Revolution, the interest rate fell
steeply in England and ﬂuctuated between 3 and 5 per cent during the
eighteenth century [North and Weingast 1989, Weir 1989, Bordo and
White 1991, Velde and Weir 1992, White 1995 and Clark 2000].20 This
is in sharp contrast to the conditions in France, where the interest rate
was always higher, rarely below 5 per cent, and sometimes much higher,
up to 13 per cent [Homer 1963, Velde and Weir 1992, Epstein 2000 and
Ferguson 2001].
This discrepancy seems to have been due to diﬀerences in the default
risk. Velde and Weir [1992] show that the market interest rate was
similar in England and France, in the 4-5 percent range, and argue that
19It is diﬃcult to collect information about market interest rates in this early period
and the default risk premium is therefore also diﬃcult to measure.
20This rate was often below the market interest rate, indicating that the English
government was highly credible [Clark 2000].
12the diﬀerence in interest rates for government borrowing: “cannot be
easily attributed to any other source than default risk” [1992, p. 5].
Bordo and White [1991] also argue that the persistent default risk of
French monarchs gave rise to the large diﬀerences in interest rates for
government borrowing.21 In support of this thesis, Quinn [2001, p. 593]
writes: “The Glorious Revolution’s political settlement appears to have
reduced the risk premium on sovereign debt”. Ferguson [2001, p. 172]
ﬁnds that, in contrast to England, “French yields in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries reveal starkly the impact of ﬁscal unreliability on
investor conﬁdence”.22
III. THE MODEL
We consider the provision of a single homogeneous governmental good
and deﬁne it as issuing a permit. An agent (government oﬃcial or private
monopolist) has the sole right to provide, and the opportunity to restrict,
the quantity of permits. We think of the agent as a tax-collector who
charges a tax which citizens must pay in order to produce or consume.
But the model could equally well reﬂect the sale of permits and licences,
21The French royal government defaulted wholly or partially on their loans in 1698,
1714, 1721, 1759, 1770 and 1788 [Ferguson 2001].
22Ad i ﬀerent explanation, however, is given by Epstein [2000] who argues that the
decline in English interest rates was the result of the country’s ﬁnancial revolution
rather than of a revolution in political freedom and rights. Another explanation is
given by Weir [1989] who argues that the French interest rate was high because the
monarchs wanted to subsidize the urban middle class that lent the money. In this pa-
per, we show that a high interest rate is not a suitable instrument for subsidies since
it reduces the rents that can be extracted through tax collection. Yet another expla-
nation is provided by Hicks [1969] who argued that, compared to absolutisms, the
relative continuity provided by the English Parliamentarism promoted low interest
rates.
13w h i c hw e r ec o m m o ni nE u r o p ea tt h et i m e . 23
Citizens have a linear inverse demand for the permits. The demand
curve is given by
p(q)=a − bq (1)
where a and b are constants, q is the number of permits allocated by the
agent and p is the price of the permits (or equivalently the tax rate). A
central authority (CA) uses the agent to extract rents from consumers.
He sells oﬃces in an auction for up-front payments, and may demand
af e e ,θ, per each permit sold by the agent, which is paid ex post. The
agent can, as in Shleifer and Vishny [1993], issue permits without paying
the CA but may then get caught by the CA, who monitors at the cost
c and penalizes him.24 The penalty is assumed to be constrained by
limited liability on the part of the agent and amounts to t = t.
There are two time periods and the CA maximizes his disposable
income. What the CA cannot extract ex ante it will borrow. However,
t h eC Ac a n n o tb o r r o wm o r et h a nt h en e tp r e s e n tv a l u eo fi t se x - p o s t
incomes. The CA-speciﬁci n t e r e s tr a t ei sg i v e nb yδ.T h e o ﬃces are
sold through a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction. Agents must also borrow
in order to buy the the position. The interest rate to which a potential
agent i can borrow is given by ri and is privately known. It is assumed
that Ri = 1
1+ri is uniformly distributed on [0,1].25 The strategy space
for the n bidders is Ri [0,1] and they are assumed to use linear strategies
23See e.g. Lipson [1948], Binney [1958], Hill [1970] and Brewer [1988].
24In theory, the CA knows if theft has occurred and would not need to monitor.
However, monitoring may be needed to verify theft. Moreover, it may well be that
the oﬃcial steals and then promptly leaves the position. To prevent this, the CA
needs to monitor the oﬃcial.
25For simplicity we normalize the market-interest rate to zero and let the interest
rate be a function of each agent’s default risk solely.
14Bi(Ri)=αiRiπ∗ where Riπ∗ is the expected value of the oﬃce.
The decisions in the model are taken in the following order: ﬁrst,
the CA selects the system of rent extraction through the fee θ, followed
by potential agents bidding for the oﬃce. Then, the theft and moni-
toring decisions are made. After that, the agent chooses the quantity,
q,a n dﬁnally, the potential penalties are enforced. The game is solved
by backward induction starting at stage four when the agent sells the
permits.
I I I . A .S t a g eF o u r :t h eM a r k e tf o rP e r m i t s




π =( a − bq)q − θq. (2)
The fee per permit, θ,which the agent has to pay to the CA is determined


















where the superscript NT denotes a no theft case. In the case of theft,







where the superscript T denotes theft.
15III.B. Stage Three: Theft and Enforcement
At stage three, the CA decides whether to monitor the agent or not and
the agent decides whether to steal or not. The payoﬀs determining the




Theft πT − t, t − c πT, 0
No Theft π(θ)NT,θ q (θ) − c π(θ)NT,θ q (θ)
Figure 1. The Game between the Agent and the Central Authority
We assume that the agent has some wealth in addition to the revenues
he earns from stealing πT, i.e., t>π T and that t>cso there are no
pure strategy equilibria of the game. We solve for the mixed strategy
equilibrium that would make the CA indiﬀerent between monitoring
and not monitoring, and the agent indiﬀerent between stealing and not
stealing. The threshold probability of theft that would make the CA





In equilibrium, the higher the monitoring cost, the higher is the proba-
bility of theft.
The threshold probability of monitoring that would make the agent





The CA’s expected proﬁts from fees, πF, are in equilibrium equal to
π
F =µγ(t − c)+( 1− µ)γ(θq(θ) − c)+( 1− γ)(1 − µ)θq(θ)=
=(1− µ)θq(θ).( 9 )
16Note that the incomes from the penalty in equilibrium exactly cover the
monitoring cost. Because the agent is held indiﬀerent between theft and
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However, since these revenues are collected ex post, the net present value







∗(θ).( 1 1 )
III.C. Stage Two: the Choice of Agents
At stage two, the CA sells the oﬃce. We assume that n identical poten-
tial agents compete for oﬃce by way of paying the CA up front in a ﬁrst






Ri − Bi)Pr(Bj ≤ Bi)
n−1 ∀j =1 ...n, j 6= i (12)
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26The CA’s expectation of the winner’s interest rate is the maximum R1 of the
sample of size n, which has the distribution F1(R)=Rn. The expected value is
therefore E(R1)=
R 1
0 RnRn−1dR = n
n+1. Hence, the CA’s expected income from
t h es a l eo ft h eo ﬃce is given by E(B∗




17This auction mechanism is, as long as n does not go to inﬁnity, inef-
ﬁcient from the CA’s perspective because the interest rates are private
information. When a potential agent selects a bid below his true value
of the oﬃce, he can win and the rent, if won, is increasing from zero to
a positive amount.
III.D. Stage One: The Choice of System of Rent
Extraction
We now analyze the CA’s choice of rent-extraction system, which we
interpret to be reﬂected by the choice of θ. In a system of direct collection
by government oﬃcials, they ﬁrst extract the rents and then provide
them to the CA. In terms of our model, this system is mimicked by a
high θ, as it generates large ex-post revenues to the CA and small rents
on part of the agent who therefore pays the CA small up-front payments.
When monopoly rights are granted to private contractors, in contrast,
they typically pay the CA before, rather than after, they have extracted
the rents. A low θ reﬂects this system since the agent’s proﬁt, and hence
up-front payment, is large whereas the CA’s ex-post income is low.
The CA maximizes his disposable incomes, or in other words, the net
present value of its two-period ﬂow of incomes. It collects the winning bid
for the oﬃce, n−1
n+1
(a−θ)2
4b , up front and borrows as much as possible. The
CA is also assumed to be credit constrained, which restricts it to borrow






initially assume that the CA can commit to its ex-ante announcement
of the fee.
When selecting the optimal system of rent extraction, the CA there-
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We can now show how the monitoring cost and the default risk aﬀect
the choice of system of rent extraction.
Proposition 1 The higher (lower) the monitoring cost, c, and default































When shaping the rent-extraction system, the CA weighs the costs
and beneﬁts of up-front collection relative to ex-post collection. The
cost of using up-front collection is that the full value of the oﬃce cannot
be collected due to the auction mechanism. The cost of using ex-post
payments is that the agent might steal and that it is costly to borrow.
A high monitoring cost, c, generates much theft such that the ex-post
revenues and the amount that can be borrowed are low. Similarly, only a
small amount can be borrowed when the default risk, δ,i sh i g h .I nb o t h
27For θ






19cases, the CA selects a low fee to enhance the agents’s proﬁta n di nt u r n
his up-front payments. In other words, the CA selects a system of private
contracting. When the default risk and the monitoring cost are low the
ex-post incomes are large. To exploit this fact, the CA uses a high fee,
i.e., it selects a system of direct collection within the government.
We next consider the distributional aspects of the model. The CA’s
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n+1(1 + δ) − 2(1 − c
t))2π
T.( 2 1 )
We can now study how the default risk and the monitoring cost aﬀect
these variables.
Proposition 2 The higher the default risk, δ, and the larger the moni-
toring cost, c, the higher is the agent’s proﬁt and the lower is the value
of the central authority’s incomes, the debt issued and the price level.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the default risk and the monitoring costs are high the CA re-
duces the fee, θ, to increase the agent’s proﬁt and consequently up-front
20payment. In other words, the agent’s proﬁt is high because the CA wants
it this way. Independently of the choice of system of rent-extraction, the
debt issued will be small as investors expect low ex-post incomes. In
addition, since a system of up-front payments is selected the debt issued
is even smaller. The CA’s rent is low even though it adjusts the system
of rent-extraction to the unfavorable conditions. When the default risk
and monitoring costs are low, a high fee is used which reduces the agent’s
proﬁt. The debt and the CA’s proﬁt are large as we would expect, and
further enhanced by the fact that ex-post collection is adopted.
Our theory thus reﬂects the historical facts well. Before the mid-
seventeenth century, the conditions were not favorable for direct collec-
tion neither in France nor in England.28 During this time, the public
ﬁnances were poor and tax farmers and monopolists’ rents large [Brewer
1988, Swart 1980]. As the cost of monitoring oﬃcials in England was
reduced, ex-post collection became more attractive. Consequently, Eng-
land started to change the system of revenue collection after the Civil
War in 1640. As O’Brien [2002, p. 262] writes, the ﬁscal system started
to change “when its /England’s/ domestic economy began to generate
the kind of accelerated urbanization, commercialization, and concentra-
tion that facilitated the collection of duties on domestic production and
imports”. But this change was partial; oﬃces were still sold [Brewer
1988]. Not until after the Glorious Revolution, when the English default
28Matthews [1958] writes “The late-medieval \French\ monarchy was not equipped
to deal with individuals in their guise as producers, wholesalers, retailers, merchants,
and consumers. The complicated activity of an economy of buying and selling was
too diﬀuse yet too localized, too subject to unforeseen changes, for a rudimentary
government to cope with on a centralized basis...Consequently, as taxes (such as
excises and customs duties) which required intensive bureaucratic management were
levied, they were farmed”.
21risk was substantially reduced, was the system of up-front collection of
rents abandoned, with the consequence of a dramatic increase in the
incomes from taxation, the debt issued, and reduction in the income of
the oﬃcials [Weir 1989, Bordo and White 1991 and Brewer 1988].
In the eighteenth century in France, in contrast, the default risk and
monitoring cost were still very high [Homer 1963 and Kiser and Kane
2001], the public ﬁnances poor [Brewer 1988 and Ekelund and Tollison
1981], and oligarchs could “cream oﬀ huge fortunes at the expense of the
monarch and the public” [Brewer, 1988 p. 130]. At this time, privileges
and perquisites were at least four times higher in France than in England
[Brewer 1988, see also Kiser and Kane 2001]. Even after the French
Revolution, French oﬃcials had to pay a sum ranging from three to ﬁve
times their salary to buy their job [Zeldin 1973].29
We ﬁnally examine the model’s implications regarding the probabil-
ities of monitoring and theft against historical evidence. It follows from
∂µ
∂c = 1





4tb < 0 that an increase in the monitoring cost
increases the equilibrium probability of theft and, because the variable






4tb < 0, an increase in the default risk will reduce the
probability of monitoring. It will, however, not aﬀect the probability of
theft.
As the theory predicts, the rate of theft and of level of monitoring
were remarkable low in England during the eighteenth century [Swart
29If indirect taxation was cumbersome in France, one may ask why the French
monarchs not turned to direct taxation. To some extend they did but they faced re-
strictions there as well. Many of the rich were for historical reasons exempted. There
were also political restrictions because direct taxation was considered particularly
unfair. Moreover, the collection of direct taxes was cumbersome as well because the
v a l u a t i o no fl a n da n dp r o p e r t i e sw a sd i ﬃcult.
221980, Brewer 1988 and Kiser and Kane 2001] and high in France [Kiser
and Kane 2001]. Brewer [1988] writes at length about the extensive mon-
itoring in the English administration and how oﬃcials were discouraged
to steal from the government.30 Brewer also reports that the number of
“supervisors”, supervising oﬃcials, increased by 469 percent from 1690
to 1780 whereas the number of excise oﬃcials increased by only 280
percent, which indicates that the probability of monitoring signiﬁcantly
i n c r e a s e di nt h i sp e r i o d .
IV. Robustness Analysis: Commitment to the Fee
I ft h eC Ac o u l dn o tc o m m i tt oi n v e s t o r s ,i tm a yn o th a v eb e e na b l et o
credibly commit to its own oﬃcials. As a check for robustness, we there-
fore include the possibility that the CA cannot commit to the variable
fee, θ.
Assume that the CA can commit to the fee, θ, with probability (1−λ).
With probability λ the CA will take θs instead where s>1.31 From
the oﬃcial’s ex-ante perspective, the expected fee is therefore equal to
θ((1− λ)+λs). The equilibrium number of permits provided by the
agent is in this augmented model equal to q∗(θ)=
a−θ(1−λ+λs)
2b and the
CA’s expected up-front payment is ε(B∗
i (θ)) = n−1
n+1
(a−θ(1−λ+λs))2
4b .T h e
amount the CA can borrow ex ante is given by the net present value of its
30Contemporaries for example described the Excise as “the monster that has ten
thousand eyes and condemned the excise man as watchful to excess.” [Brewer, 1988
p. 113] Brewer also writes colorfully “An oﬃcer’s supervisor was likely to swoop into
his round at any moment, take up the exciseman’s entry book and follow him on his
journey, checking his gauges and ensuring that he had left specimen papers at the
premises he had declared he would inspect.” [Brewer, 1988 p. 109]
31An absolutistic central authority would expropriate the oﬃcial’s whole proﬁte x
post. We assume that it is not absolutistic and it can therefore only take θs.
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Proposition 3 An increase in the probability to commit to the agent in-
creases the use of ex-post payments, the debt issued and the CA’s proﬁts,
and reduces the agent’s rent.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider an increase in the probability to commit to the agent, i.e., a
reduction in λ. The CA’s response is to increase the announced fee such
the agent’s expected proﬁt is reduced. In other words, the CA increases
the use of direct collection within the government. This change increases
32To emphasize that the default risk, δ, and the probability to commit to oﬃcials,
λ, yield the same qualitative results we treat them as independent of each other.
24the debt issued (even though the expected quantity is reduced). The net
present value of the CA’s income increases both directly and through the
adjustment of the rent-extraction mechanism.
This extension of the model, which takes into account not only the
CA’s probability to commit to investors but also the probability to com-
mit to its public oﬃcials, is consistent with the historical evidence. The
French monarchs’ best response to their low probability to commit was
to use up-front payments in a system of tax farming. The English Par-
liament, in contrast, could commit to its decisions and therefore found
ex-post payments by government oﬃcials attractive.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new perspective on the system of taxa-
tion in England in the second half of the seventeenth and the beginning
of the eighteenth century, when a changeover to direct collection gave
rise to better public ﬁnances than the system of its major competitor,
France. In our model, the leading regime extracts rents from taxation
or agents’ sales of government goods, such as permits, either through
up-front payments or through ex-post payments based on the quantity
of goods oﬃcials sell. Both interest rates on government borrowing and
monitoring costs inﬂuence which scheme politicians prefer. Owing to
their higher default risk, French monarchs faced higher interest rates
on borrowing than the English Parliament. In response, they continued
to use tax-farming and grant monopoly rights, which led to large rents
to the contractors and small incomes for the monarchs. In addition,
since monitoring costs were higher in France, fees were cumbersome to
extract, which also made the granting of monopolies more attractive.
In England, in contrast, fees were collected ex post within the govern-
25ment administration, which implied small revenues to oﬃcials and large
revenues to the leaders.
In other words, France adopted an institutional design where the
monarch and oligarchs divided the surplus among themselves. In Eng-
land, Parliament extracted the surplus from taxation at the expense of
oligarchs and oﬃcials. According to our theoretical model, then, the
institutional reform, which led to better public ﬁnances, was not a re-
sult of a benevolent parliament, but rather the outcome of opportunistic
behavior on the part of parliamentarians who were suﬃciently powerful
in shaping institutions for their private beneﬁt. In England, this turned
out to provide a favorable climate for industrialization. In France, the
circumstances eventually led to revolution.
26APPENDIX
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The debt ﬁnally is reduced due to an increase in the monitoring costs
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27P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
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